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forces.  Turkey received  sizable volumes  of new  lending and debt relief  in 
1980-84.  The  new  policy  stance  produced  an  export-led  recovery  and 
acceptable degree of creditworthiness by  1982-83,  just as most of the LDC 
debtors were entering a deep crisis phase in their development process. After 
the termination of debt relief in 1984, Turkey began to face an increase in its 
external debt service.  This strained the fiscal position and required  a large 
rise in domestic borrowing at high real rates of interest. 
1.4  Plan of the Monograph 
Our  monograph  is  organized  in  two  parts.  Following  the  broad 
retrospective provided  on Turkish economic development  in this chapter, in 
part  1  (chapters  2  to  5)  we  examine  the  aggregate  performance  and 
adjustment  patterns  from  1973  to  1986.  These  chapters  constitute  an 
analytical  chronology  of  the  policy  phases  outlined  above.  In  part  2 
(chapters 6 to  10) we focus on selected aspects of  internal adjustment and 
external  debt.  Chapter  6 presents  the  principal  findings  of  a  multisector 
general  equilibrium  analysis  and evaluates  the  interactions  among external 
borrowing, trade liberalization, and exchange rate policy. Chapter 7 explores 
in  greater  detail  the  sources  of  Turkey’s  export  boom  in  the  post-1980 
period.  In  chapters  8  and  9  we  assess  public  finance  and  external  debt 
management,  respectively.  In  chapter  10, we  recapitulate  our conclusions 
and discuss the prospects for the future of  debt management  in Turkey. An 
appendix contains a political chronology, as well as supplementary tables on 
subjects covered in the main text of the monograph. 
2  Economic Boom and Debt 
Crisis, 1973 -  77 
For the Turkish economy, the  1970s were the best of times and the worst of 
times.  The  decade  witnessed  an  unprecedented  spurt  of  investment  and 
growth  until  about  1977,  accompanied  by  what  looked  like  a  steady 
improvement  in  income  distribution.  That  was  followed  by  a crash  which 
was  equally  unprecedented.  From  mid-1977  on, Turkey  found  itself  in  a 
monumental  debt  crisis  which  took  several  years  of  intricate  negotiations 
with  creditors  and  a  long  series  of  rescheduling  agreements  to  resolve. 
Growth suffered heavily, with two years of real contraction at the end of the 
decade, and  income distribution  turned  sharply  against  urban  workers  and 
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This chapter and the next are devoted to providing an analytical overview 
of this boom-and-bust experience.  The present chapter is concerned with the 
period  immediately  preceding  the  debt  crisis  of  1977,  providing  an 
interpretation  of  the  economic  boom  as  well  as  an  explanation  for  the 
ultimate  crisis.  The period  of  forced  adjustment  between  the  onset  of  the 
crisis in mid-1977 and the reform package of January  1980-a  period of vast 
importance despite its short duration-is  the subject of chapter 3. 
With hindsight,  it  is not  too difficult to provide a broad  interpretation of 
the Turkish experience prior to  1977. The early years of the decade were a 
time of great optimism as the perennial foreign exchange constraint appeared 
to have been permanently relaxed, thanks largely to a rapid rise in  workers’ 
remittances. As table 2.  I  shows, the current account was actually in surplus 
for two years in a row in 1972 and  1973. Partly as a consequence, the public 
sector went  on  an  investment  binge  shortly  thereafter  and  encouraged  the 
private  sector  to follow  suit. As  the  share of  investment  rose  from  18.1 
percent of GNP (in  1973) to 25.0 percent  (in  1977), the real growth rate of 
the economy reached  its zenith at 8.9 percent (in  1975 and  1976). 
There were two problems,  however.  First,  all of this was taking place in 
the context of  the fourfold rise in world oil prices.  Second, the government 
succumbed  to  all  of  the  usual  policy  pitfalls:  price  distortions,  including 
overvalued  exchange  rates,  and  large  public  sector  deficits.  These helped 
swing the current account sharply into deficit,  moving it from a surplus of 
$534  million  in  1973 to a  deficit  of  $3,431 million  in  1977. The current 
account  deficits  were  financed  by  external  borrowing,  much  of  it  of 
short-term maturity. 
As  foreign  lenders  started  getting jittery  at  the  beginning  of  1977, the 
stage was set for a debt crisis.  Capital flows slowed down to a trickle,  and 
Table 2.1  Macroeconomic Performance of Turkey During the 1970s 
Current 
Account 
Real GDP  Inflation Rate  Balance  Investment 
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the central bank’s  depleted reserves forced it into arrears on  payments to 
foreign banks, governments, and export suppliers. The consequent foreign 
exchange shortages led to a forced reduction of  the current account deficit 
via administrative means,  the collapse of  investment and  growth,  and  an 
upsurge of inflation (see table 2.1). The next few years witnessed a series of 
debt renegotiations with creditors. 
What were the sources of this debt debacle? Conventional wisdom stresses 
the adverse external environment and the short-term nature of the liabilities 
incurred during 1973-77.  But more must have been at work. Until the debt 
crisis of  1982 came along, Turkey’s debt problems were among the most 
severe  experienced  by  the  postwar  international  system,  and  its  debt 
reschedulings were  the  largest undertaken  to  date.  As  table  2.2 reveals, 
Turkey  alone  accounted  for  69.0  percent  of  the  total  volume  of  debt 
renegotiated  by  developing countries  in the  1978-80  period.  These facts 
point to a peculiar aspect of  the Turkish experience.  Unlike practically all 
other newly  industrializing countries experiencing debt difficulties, Turkey 
got into trouble after the first oil  shock, rather than  the  second one.  This 
suggests prima facie that the usual explanations of  the crisis in terms of  a 
combination of external shocks with a number of key inappropriate domestic 
policies-such  as overvalued exchange rates and a lax monetary and fiscal 
stance-will  go at best only part of the way in explaining its origins.’ Unless 
it can be demonstrated that the shocks were particularly severe and/or the 
policies particularly excessive, the analyst has to look for additional reasons 
for Turkey’s precocious debt crisis. 
We  argue in this chapter that the key to the puzzle is Turkey’s dependence 
between  1975 and  1977 on a form of  foreign borrowing with  intrinsically 
destabilizing  features.  To  attract  capital  inflows,  the  authorities  relied 
disproportionately on the “convertible Turkish lira deposit”  scheme, whose 
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key feature was that it protected domestic borrowers from all exchange risk. 
As will be explained below, this scheme had the fatal flaw of engendering an 
ever-expanding  spiral of  overborrowing  by  the private  sector.  Even  though 
the counterpart to the current account deficits was, in an accounting  sense, 
an investment boom by the public sector, the boom was sustainable only to 
the  extent  that  foreign banks  were  willing  to  increase  their  exposure to 
Turkey  at  an  ever-increasing  pace.  Once  foreign  banks  slowed their  net 
lending, the edifice collapsed. 
Hence  it  was  primarily  the  dynamics of  the  debt accumulation  process 
itself that was responsible for the early onset of the crisis. Fiscal, monetary, 
and  exchange rate policies  of  the  authorities  would  likely  have  gotten  the 
country  into  trouble  eventually.  But  the  borrowing  “strategy”  in  place 
ensured that this would come sooner rather than later. 
2.1  External Shocks and Policies: International Comparisons 
To put Turkey’s experience in the mid-1970s in its proper perspective, it is 
useful to start with a brief comparative look. Was Turkey subjected to larger 
external shocks than other developing countries? There is some evidence that 
the oil shock of  1973-74  had somewhat more severe consequences on the 
balance-of-payments  position of  Turkey than in most other similarly  placed 
countries. In  table  2.3 we summarize Bela  Balassa’s  (1984) findings with 
respect  to  the  magnitude  of  the  shocks experienced  during  1974-76  by 
twenty-four  oil-importing  countries,  among  which  Turkey  is  included. 
Balassa’s  calculations  cover  the  terms-of-trade  effect,  as  well  as  the 
reduction  in export demand due to the recession  in industrial countries.2 It 
appears that Turkey fared relatively badly on the first score, largely because 
Turkey’s exports scarcely benefited  from the offsetting  price rises common 
to many commodities besides oil. 
Moreover,  Balassa’s  calculations  understate  the magnitude  of  the  shocks 
experienced  by  Turkey. These do not take  into account the fall in  workers’ 
remittances consequent upon the reduction of economic activity in Germany 
and other countries in which the Turkish Gastarbeiter were concentrated. To 
Table 2.3  Balance-of-Payments Effects of External Shocks, 1974-76 
(as a percentage of GNP) 
Terms-of-Trade  Export Volume  Remittance 
Effect  Effect  Effect  Total 
24 Developing Countrics”  - 
Turkey  ~ 
4.2 
11 
-0.7  - 




Sourcer  Balassa (1984) and own  calculations (see text) 
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correct for the omission, we have followed Balassa's procedure  to estimate 
the  balance-of-payments  effect  of  the  derived  reduction  in  workers' 
remittances.  The estimate reported in table 2.3 is based  on a conservative 
procedure which assumes the following: (a) in the absence of the reduction 
in foreign  activity, remittances  would  have continued to grow  at the trend 
rate observed during 1972-74;  and (b) with the reduction in foreign activity 
but  no  significant  additional  policy  distortions,  the  level  of  remittances 
would  have  remained  at  the  1974  level  throughout  1974-76.3  This 
procedure adds another -  1.7 percent (of GNP) to the external shocks faced 
by Turkey,  bringing  the total to  -9.2  percent  for the  1974-76  period. By 
contrast, the average shock for Balassa's sample of  oil importers amounted 
to  -4.9  percent.  The effect  of  this  difference should  not  be exaggerated, 
however. Even with the remittance effect added for Turkey, Balassa's figures 
show nine countries (out of  twenty-four) with more severe shocks, including 
Yugoslavia,  Philippines,  Portugal, Israel, and Korea. 
Turning  to economic policies,  the next  question  is  whether  policies  in 
Turkey in  the immediate  aftermath  of  the  first oil  shock were considerably 
more distortionary  than in other countries. We will analyze these policies in 
more detail below,  but  for the moment  the tentative  answer has to be:  not 
really.  This can be seen by  concentrating on three  aspects of  policy  which 
have borne the brunt of criticism: exchange rate policy,  budget deficits, and 
pricing  of  domestic  energy.  In  table 2.4 we  summarize evidence on these 
policies  for  Turkey  and  a  sample  of  other  developing countries.  While 
Turkey appears to have been hardly a paragon of  virtue in these respects, it 
Table 2.4  Policy Comparisons,  1973-77 
Domestic Energy  Price 
as a % of World 
Appreciation  Government  Price.  I977 
of Real  Budget Deficit. 
Exchange Rate,  1975-76  Regular  Residual 
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nonetheless  was  not  a  particularly  promiscuous  offender  of  economic 
rationality either. 
The proximate cause for Turkey’s debt crisis can be observed in the rapid 
deterioration  of  its  current  account  during  the  period.  In  table  2.5  we 
compare Turkey with other developing countries in that respect. Here we see 
the relatively quick turnaround of  the Turkish current account from a surplus 
of 2.4  percent of GNP in  1973 to a deficit of 5.1 percent in  1975, slightly 
higher  than  for all  developing  countries.  This more  rapid  deterioration  is 
consistent with the possibility that external shocks were indeed more severe 
in the Turkish case than on average.  However, the distinguishing  aspect of 
the  Turkish  performance  comes  after  1975:  whereas  other  oil-importing 
countries managed to reduce their deficits to 2.1 percent of  GNP by  1977, 
Turkey’s  deficit  continued  to grow  and  reached  7.1  percent.  The  initial 
deterioration can be accounted for by the oil shock, but the trend after  1975 
requires additional  explanations. 
What  lay  behind  these  deficits,  and  were  they  large  enough  to  have 
brought about the crisis? A preview of the arguments contained in the next 
two sections would go as follows. First, the counterpart to these deficits was 
an increased investment effort, mainly by the public sector. Hence, external 
borrowing  was  used  primarily  for  investment  purposes  and  not  for 
consumption.  Secondly, while consumption and investment decisions in the 
economy  were  considerably  distorted  by  inappropriate  pricing  policies, 
mainly  an  overvalued  exchange  rate,  these  alone would  not  have  brought 
about the crisis. What probably tipped the balance was the dynamics of the 
debt  process  itself.  To  prevent  private  sector  crowding-out  and  to  ensure 
foreign exchange availability  for its own needs,  the government  subsidized 
private  sector  foreign  borrowing  by  providing  blanket  protection  against 
foreign  exchange  risk.  As  we  shall  show  below,  this  type  of  external 
financing  contained the germs of its own destruction.  The implicit  subsidy 
on foreign borrowing was larger the greater the likelihood of a crisis; in turn, 
the crisis became more likely  as borrowing  skyrocketed.  Hence, while  the 
underlying cause of the deteriorating external balance has to be located in the 
public  sector investment drive, what precipitated the debt crisis per se was 
private  sector borrowing behavior,  itself in turn conditioned by government 
policy. 
Table 2.5  Current Account Balances,  1972-77  (as a percentage of GNP) 
1972  1973  I974  1975  1976  1977 
All LDCs  -  1.7  -  1.3  -  2.3  -4.2  -2.8  -  2.6 
Oil-importing LDCs  -  1.5  -  1.1  -3.9  -4.3  -2.6  -2.1 
Turkey  0.3  2.4  -2.2  -5.1  -5.4  -7.1 
Sources: World Bank, World Developmenr Reporr  1985, p.  17; and central bank of  Turkey 635  TurkeyIChapter 2 
2.2  Public Investment, Current Account Deficits, and Debt 
The  political  scenery  of  the  1970s  was  replete  with  instability  and 
volatility, and no economic account of the period is complete without at least 
lip  service to  this  fact.  After  1973 Turkey  was  governed by  a  series of 
coalition governments of varying political outlooks. Following the defeat of 
the right-wing Justice Party in the 1973 elections, Demirel was replaced as 
premier  by  Bulent  Ecevit  who  led  an  awkward  coalition  between  his 
left-of-center Republican People’s Party and the Islamist National Salvation 
Party. In March 1975, a new coalition of right-wing parties brought Demirel 
to power once again. This coalition lasted until the general elections of June 
1977 which proved indecisive. After an unsuccessful try by  Ecevit, Demirel 
was  then  able to  resuscitate his  previous coalition,  which  lasted however 
only  until  January  1978. Ecevit’s minority  government which  replaced it 
collapsed in turn in October 1979, enabling Demirel to return to power once 
again. 
The lack  of  decisive central authority during  those  years  is  frequently 
alleged to have been the main source of inadequate economic policymaking. 
While this is no doubt true, it should not cloud the fact that a series of weak 
governments of varying political ilk still managed to undertake an impressive 
and sustained investment boom. Table 2.6 documents the steady increase in 
the investment ratio after  1973, rising  from  18.1 percent of  GNP to 25.0 
percent in  1977. That the investment effort was spearheaded by  the public 
sector is equally clear. Public investment almost doubled from 7.0 to  13.1 
percent of GNP,  while the private sector investment rate remained roughly 
constant in the 10- 12 percent range. 
Table 2.6  Investment-Savings Balance and Growth of Real Expenditures, 1973-77 
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The structure of investment reflected  the underlying economic philosophy 
of  the  various  governments  in  power,  with  industry  and  infrastructure 
receiving emphasis. In table 2.7 we show the distribution of  investment by 
major sectors during  1973-77  and compare the breakdown  with the earlier 
1968-72  period. The only important difference is the greater emphasis on 
transportation  projects  after  1973.  In  the  later  period,  investment  in 
transportation  accounted  for no  less  than  a  quarter of  total  public  sector 
investment.  It is tempting  to speculate  about whether  the ultimate outcome 
would  have  been  much  different  had  a  greater  share of  investment  been 
allocated  to  tradables  sectors.  In  all  likelihood,  the  microeconomics  of 
project selection played only a secondary role in precipitating the debt crisis. 
First,  it  is difficult  to argue that  the  social  rates  of  return  to infrastructure 
projects  in  a  country  like  Turkey  are  systematically  lower  than  in,  say, 
agriculture.  Second, as the Turkish experience of the 1980s shows, it would 
not have been too difficult to  generate an export boom with an  unchanged 
economic structure,  once the  appropriate  macroeconomic  environment was 
established. 
The deliberate expansion of  investment  in  this period  was not  accompa- 
nied  by  policies  that  would  ensure  a  commensurate  level  of  domestic 
resource mobilization; this is perhaps where the fragility of  the governments 
of the time most clearly exhibits itself. As shown in table 2.6, the aggregate 
saving rate actually fell between  1973 and 1977, reflecting the consumption- 
stimulating influence of  the growing overvaluation  of  the exchange rate (on 
which  more  later).  The private  sector’s  contribution  to the  public  sector’s 
savings-investment gap was nil, as the former became incapable after 1974 
of  generating  enough  resources  even for its own investments. The private 
sector  balance  was  in  deficit  at  the  level  of  2  percent  of  GNP  during 
1975-76  until  the  foreign  exchange  crisis  of  1977  brought  private 
expenditures crashing down. 
Table 2.7  Structure of Fixed Investment,  1968-72  and 1973-77 (in percentages) 
1968-72  I973 -  77 
Public  Private  Total  Public  Private  Total 
Agriculture  13.0  9.  I  11.1  10 0  13.4  11.6 
Industry  42.4  34.7  38.9  44.5  36.  I  36.7 
Manufacturing  21.8  31.9  26.7  24.0  35.  I  26.3 
Mining  4.9  1.4  3.3  6.6  0.6  3.6 
Energy  15.7  1.4  8.9  13.9  0.4  6.8 
Transportation & communication  21 .O  10.3  16.0  25.0  15.5  21.6 
Health and education  9.6  0.3  6.3  6.4  0.2  4.6 
Housing  3.6  38.5  20. I  2.3  32.6  17.9 
Others  10.4  7.1  7.6  11.8  2.2  7.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  World Bank (1980). tables 8 and 9. 637  TurkeyXhapter 2 
As  the boom  in investment would suggest, the remarkable aspect of  the 
foreign borrowing  experience in  this period  was  the  use  of  these foreign 
funds  for  investment,  rather  than  consumption.  The  figures  in  table  2.6 
amply attest to this. Net use of foreign savings rose in this period from -  2.2 
percent of GNP in  1973 to 6.9 percent in 1977.4 This amounts to a rise in the 
external  borrowing  ratio  of  9.1  percentage  points.  Of  this  increase,  6.9 
percentage points (or 76 percent) are accounted for by  the rise in investment, 
and only 2.3 percentage points by  the rise in cons~mption.~  The role of the 
public  sector is  also clear: 92 percent  of  the  increase  in  the  net  foreign 
savings  ratio  is  accounted  for  by  the  deterioration  of  the  public  sector 
balance, and only 8 percent by  the decrease in net  private savings. This is 
clearly a case of  foreign borrowing to finance public investment. Whether it 
amounted to overborrowing or not is an  important question which  will  be 
addressed below. 
The  deterioration of  the  public  sector  finances  can  be  observed  more 
clearly in the trends of  the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). In 
table 2.8 we adjust the public sector savings-investment gap calculated from 
the national accounts (and displayed in  table 2.6) with additional financial 
items to amve at an aggregate PSBR.6 The results show the rise in the PSBR 
over the 1973-77  period to be equally dramatic: from 2.0 percent of GNP to 
10.6 per~ent.~ 
In  table  2.8 we  also  present  the  available  evidence  on  the  modes  of 
financing of these deficits. Despite a somewhat large "other"  category for 
certain years, the inescapable conclusion is that foreign borrowing did not 
Table 2.8  The PSBR and its Financing, 1973-77  (as a percentage of  GNP) 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
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~  1.3 
n.a. 
18.4  20.9 
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play  an  important  role  in  financing  the  public  sector  directly.'  Foreign 
borrowing  by  the  public  sector  remained  well  below  1 percent  of  GNP 
throughout the period. The single largest source of financing was instead the 
central bank, which  provided  more than half  of  the funds needed  over the 
period  1974-77.  Now this might seem surprising  in view of  the close links 
drawn  above between  the  public  sector imbalance and  foreign  borrowing. 
The apparent  contradiction  is resolved  by  looking  at  the  financing  of  the 
public  sector  in  general-equilibrium  rather than  partial-equilibrium  terms. 
Foreign  borrowing  did  indeed  finance  the  public  sector,  but  it  did  so 
indirectly  via  the  intermediation  of  the banking  sector,  and of  the  central 
bank  in  particular.  To  see how  the  system  worked,  we have  to turn  to an 
analysis of the nature of the external liabilities incurred during this period. 
Since the  current  account deficit  is  the  mirror  image  of  the  domestic 
savings-investment  imbalance, we first  take  a  look  at the  financing of  the 
former.  Table  2.9 shows that  the  cumulative current  account deficit  from 
1974 to 1977 amounted to $7.5 billion. Around  17 percent of  this deficit was 
financed by running down the reserves of the central bank, and 8 1 percent by 
borrowing, with foreign direct  investment  playing  an insignificant role.  By 
far  the  most  important  item  among  the  financing  entries,  however,  is 
short-term borrowing, which accounted for more than half of  the cumulative 
deficit.  As  will  be  discussed  below,  short-term  borrowing  was  typically 
channeled through  the central bank, and did not constitute a liability of the 
consolidated  government or of  the  SEES. Long-term  borrowing,  most  of 
which did constitute a liability of the public sector, made up only 22 percent 
of  the cumulative deficit. 
Table 2.9  Financing the Current Account,  1973-77  (million $) 
1973  1974  1975  1976  I977  I974 -  77 
Current account balance 
Nondebt financing 
Foreign direct investment 
Change in reserves' 
Counterpart to 
valuation changes 
Net foreign borrowing 
Long term 
IMF 
Implied short term 
534 
~  625 
79 
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1,648  -2,029  - 
503  94 
114  10 
429  54 
-  40  30 
1,145  1,935 
I48  509 
248  143 
749  1,283 
3,140  -7,479 
375  1,429 (19.1%) 
27  184 (2.5%) 
349  1,256 (16.8%) 
-1  -11  (-0.1%) 
2,765  6.050 (80.9%) 
782  1,636 (21.9%) 
18  409  (5.5%) 
1,965  3,989 (53.3%) 
Sources:  Current-account  and nondebt financing figures are from the central bank of Turkey; long-term debt 
flows are from the World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues; net borrowing  from the IMF is  from the 
central  bank  of  Turkey  and  the  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics; short-term  borrowing  has  been 
calculated as the residual, and includes errors and omissions and arrears besides the usual forms of short-term 
lending. 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses  are the percentage distribution of  the current account financing. 
"A positive (negative) number denotes decrease (increase) in reserves. 639  TurkeyIChapter 2 
A better idea of  the predominant role of  short-term debt can be obtained 
from table 2.10 in which Turkey’s outstanding external debt is disaggregated 
by  maturity and type of  liability. Notice that while these stock statistics tell 
broadly the same story as the  flow  statistics of  table 2.9,  the two sets of 
figures are not perfectly consistent with each other as flows do not exactly 
match the difference between  stocks.  Beside the usual statistical problems 
with recording and omissions, the discrepancies are also due to changes in 
valuation  as  cross-rates  fluctuate.  Hence,  since  a  considerable  share  of 
Turkey’s short-term debt is denominated in deutsche marks, the dollar value 
of  Turkey’s external debt rises when the deutsche mark appreciates (as it did 
after  1975, for example). From the perspective of  debt management, such 
fluctuations create special problems, some of  which we  will discuss below. 
Leaving  these  valuation  problems  aside,  table  2.10  documents  the 
phenomenal rise in short-term liabilities after 1974. Within the span of  three 
years, short-term liabilities rose from a meager 6.4 to 54.0 percent of  total 
external debt. To put this rise in perspective, note that the comparable figure 
for all oil-importing developing countries barely budged from  14.1 to  15.3 
Table 2.10  External Debt and its Composition,  1973-77  (million $) 
1973  1974  I975  1976  1977 
Total external debt 
Long-term debt 




Convertible TL deposits 
(of which: overdue) 
Banker’s credits 
Overdrafts 




































































































Sources:  World Bank, IMF, and the central bank of Turkey. Data for short-term debt of nonoil LDCs are from 
IMF, Recent Multilateral Debt Resrructurings  with Officinl and Bank Creditors, December 1983, table  1. 
aFigure for banker’s credits for 1973 is included under convertible TL deposits for that year. 
bLiabilities to  the IMF have not been included under short-term debt. 640  Merih Celgsun and Dani Rodrik 
percent.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  this  short-term  debt  (around  85 
percent) was, directly or indirectly, a liability of  the central bank. 
The  hallmark  of  the  foreign  debt  experience  in  this  period  was  an 
innovative form of borrowing called the ‘‘convertible Turkish lira deposits” 
(CTLDs) scheme. As the figures in table 2.10 show, this type of short-term 
debt dominates in volume all the rest. At the end of  1977, CTLDs amounted 
to 37.2 percent of all short-term liabilities. This share rises to 48.9 percent if 
we  exclude  payments  arrears  and  overdue  CTLDs.  At  the  end  of  1976, 
before the impending crisis slowed the flow, they accounted for 58.3 percent 
of  all short-term debt. Hence, the CTLD scheme played a determining role 
at the margin in financing the current account deficits of the period. 
What were the CTLDs? In  May  1975 the pressure from the balance  of 
payments led the government to resuscitate an old scheme whereby nonresi- 
dents could open deposit accounts with Turkish commercial banks.’  Principal 
and interest payments on these deposits were guaranteed by  the government 
(effectively by the central bank) against all foreign exchange risk arising from 
devaluations of the Turkish lira. The interest rate ceiling on such deposits was 
initially  set  at  1.75 percentage points  above  the  Euromarket rate  for the 
corresponding currency. Upon the opening of the CTLD account, the recipient 
bank would turn over the foreign currency to the central bank and have its 
account with the central bank credited with the Turkish lira equivalent of the 
deposit.  The  local  bank  could  then  extend  loans  denominated in  liras to 
domestic firms. As interest and principal payments on CTLDs became due, 
the foreign lender would recover the original deposit plus interest, both  in 
foreign currency. The central bank would in turn cover any loss experienced 
by the local bank due to the depreciation of the Turkish lira since the opening 
of the CTLD account. 
The CTLD scheme was a wonderful  system whereby  the public  sector 
could finance its deficits, while the private sector, far from being crowded 
out, ended up  itself as the beneficiary of a credit explosion. To  see this in 
greater detail, it pays to follow how CTLD funds were cycled (table 2.11). 
For  the  sake of  concreteness,  consider  the  consequences  for the  banking 
sector of an increase in foreign liabilities of DMlO  in the form of a CTLD. 
Table 2.11  The CTLD Scheme 
Assets  Liabilities 
Step  1 
Step 2 
Commercial bank  Foreign exchange reserve of  DMlOO  Deposit of  DMlOO 
Commercial bank  Loan  of  TL528  Deposit of  DMlOO 
Central bank  Reserves of  DMlOO 
Central bank 
Increase in base money of TL528 
Increase in base money of TL528 
Step 3 
TL528 domestic credit to government 641  TurkeyKhapter 2 
In  step  1 of  the  process,  the  domestic  bank  holds  a  deposit  liability of 
DM100, balanced by  its holdings of DMlOO in foreign exchange. Next, the 
commercial bank  turns the DMlOO  over to the central bank,  in  return  for 
which it is credited the Turkish lira equivalent of DMlOO, say TL528 (at the 
rate prevailing at the end of  1975). Abstracting from reserve requirements, 
the commercial bank can in turn use this to make loans to its customers. In 
step 2, there has been  an  increase in  base  money  arising from the credit 
extended to  the  commercial  bank  by  the  central  bank.  In  the  final  step, 
consider what happens as the public sector borrows from the central bank to 
finance  its  investment  drive.  The  increased  public  sector  expenditure 
eventually turns up in the form of  imports, requiring foreign currency to be 
supplied by  the  central  bank.  When  the  process  is  complete,  the  money 
supply has  increased (by 528 times the money multiplier minus  one), the 
private sector enjoys new credits, and the government has found the foreign 
exchange with which to finance its investment. lo 
There are two noteworthy  aspects of  this type of  borrowing.  First,  the 
government's  ambitious investment program was being funded by  accumu- 
lating liabilities of  short-term maturity. Indeed,  most  of  the CTLDs were 
of  one-year maturity,  and the rollover rate appears to have been  less than 
40 percent (Brennan 1976). These funds were being used to finance invest- 
ment projects with considerably longer gestation lags. "  Hence such foreign 
borrowing was inherently risky given the maturity transformation involved. 
Second, the level of such borrowing was determined not by  the central bank 
or the public sector at large, but by the private sector, even though the major 
part of the resources thus mobilized ended up being used by the public sector. 
Essentially, the public sector investment drive acted as a powerful vacuum 
into which all foreign exchange brought in  by  the private sector would be 
quickly sucked. This played a crucial role in precipitating the debt crisis. The 
reason is that  the  incentives provided to  the  private  sector by  the CTLD 
scheme  were  fundamentally  destabilizing.  The  argument  here  requires  a 
closer look at the operation of  the CTLDs during the  1975-77  period, to 
which we now turn. 
2.3  The CTLD Scheme in Practice 
The CTLD  scheme is typically portrayed  as having provided exchange 
guarantees to foreign lenders. While this is true, it is only part of the story. 
The return to foreign commercial banks taking part in the scheme consisted 
of the relevant Euromarket interest rate,  i*,  plus the spread, (+,  of about 1.75 
percent  plus  whatever front-end  fee, 6,  they  could  extract.  The  nominal 
return to the foreign lender in foreign currency terms, q*, can be written as: 
(2.1)  q*  = i*  + (+  + 4. 642  Merih Celisun and Dani Rodrik 
The lenders had  no reason  to concern  themselves  with  devaluations of  the 
lira, save for possible effects on the liquidity of the country. 
What  has been  less recognized  is that  the primary  role of  the exchange 
guarantee was to provide  the eventual domestic users  of  the CTLD credits 
with  an  interest  rate  subsidy.  Remember that  the  local  commercial banks 
used the domestic currency counterpart of the CTLDs to make loans to the 
private sector. From the perspective of the domestic firms (i.e., in domestic 
currency  terms),  the  nominal  cost  of  funds, q, borrowed  in  this  fashion 
consisted  of  the  nominal  return  to the foreign  lender,  q*, plus  a  margin, 
p,-of  perhaps 0.5 percent-acquired  by the intermediating  local bank: 
q = q*  + p. 
Notice how the domestic borrower has been insulated from exchange risk, as 
the expected rate of depreciation of the lira appears nowhere in this formula. 
The interest rate effect of  this  scheme from the perspective  of  domestic 
borrowers can be conceptually separated into two components. First, there is 
the effect  of  allowing  the private  sector to borrow  abroad, where no such 
possibility  existed  before.  Given  the  prior  restrictions,  this  is  just  like 
removing a tax on foreign borrowing, with the initial rate of  the tax set at the 
price-equivalent  level of  the restriction.  It is reasonable to assume that  the 
“effective”  domestic  interst rate-i.e.,  taking  into account domestic credit 
rationing and curb markets-exceeded  foreign interest rates (adjusted by the 
expected  rate  of  currency  depreciation)  in  the  presence  of  borrowing 
restrictions; in other words, the implicit tax rate can be assumed to have been 
positive. This effect would naturally boost foreign borrowing. 
However, the CTLD scheme had an additional element of subsidy deriving 
from  the  exchange  guarantee.  The  subsidy  consisted  of  the  difference 
between  the  cost  faced  by  the  domestic  borrowers,  q,  and  the  true 
opportunity cost of  foreign  funds, the latter of  which  was made up of  the 
sum of  three elements:  the rate  of  return  to the  foreign  lenders  in  foreign 
currency,  q*,  the  intermediating  margin  of  the  local  banks,  p, and  the 
expected  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  domestic currency, 2.  From  equation 
(2.2), the implied subsidy, s, can be seen to equal simply the expected rate 
of depreciation of  the home currency: 
(2.3) 
This  makes  obvious  sense  since  the  system  insulated  borrowers  from 
exchange rate movements.  Some estimates of the magnitude of  these implicit 
subsidies are presented in table 2.12. 
To  recapitulate,  there  are  two  important  lessons  in  all  this.  First,  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  the scheme was that  it  acted  as an  implicit 
subsidy on foreign  borrowing  by  domestic  firms. As the evidence in table 
2.12  indicates,  the  magnitude  of  the  subsidies  involved  was  hardly 
negligible,  amounting to 1.1 percent of  GNP by the end of  1976. Secondly, 
s = (q  *  + p  + 2)  - q = 2. 643  TurkeyIChapter 2 
Table 2.12  Estimates of the Subsidy Component of  the CTLD Scheme 
Year-end 
1975  1976  1977 









Total (million $) 
Share of GNPd (8) 
Estimated interest rate subsidy for borrowing 




























Sources: Tables 2.10 and 2.13: and IMF, International  Financial  Statistics. 
'Actual  rate  of depreciation during the following year. 
bWeights are the shares of  different currencies in table 2.13 
'Calculated  as the average subsidy rate multiplied by  the outstanding stock of  CTLD liabilities at  year end. 
'%e  denominator used  here  is  the  following  year's GNP since  the  subsidy  amounts  are  calculated  for 
year-end figures. 
the level of  such subsidization was not fixed and depended on the state of 
expectations.  Anything  which  fueled,  say,  domestic  inflationary  expecta- 
tions, in turn giving rise to expectations of greater depreciation, would also 
raise the subsidy element, reducing the ex ante cost of  foreign borrowing. 
We  will analyze the implications of  this for the debt accumulation process 
below. But first some details on the operation of  the CTLDs. 
It will not  come as a surprise after the account above that it was private 
sector firms which took the lead in attracting CTLDs to the domestic banking 
sector. Typically, a Turkish firm would locate a foreign bank willing to make 
the deposit,  and  would  be  the  beneficiary  of  the  credit  extended by  the 
domestic bank using the counterpart funds. With a spread of  1.75 percent 
and front-end fees running around 4 percent, there was in fact little difficulty 
at first in attracting foreign lenders.'* In addition, some of the inflows were 
engineered  through  capital  flight:  many  entrepreneurs  bought  foreign 
exchange in the black market and channeled these funds back in via selected 
foreign banks. By  the time of  the collapse, more than two hundred foreign 
banks  had  been  lured.  Detailed  information  about  these  transactions  is 
scarce. There is, however, one survey which covers the operations of six of 
the  largest  intermediary  local  banks.  Information  from  this  survey  is 
summarized in table 2.13. The table covers a total of  547 separate deposits 
made  by  foreign banks,  amounting to  $517.7  million  (at  year-end  1977 
exchange rates), which  is 23 percent of  all CTLD liabilities at the end of 
1977. 644  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
Table 2.13  Summary Information on a Sample of CTLDs 
Deposits 
DM  SFr  US$  NLG  Total 
Amount (thousand $)”  373,525  116,950  26,597  581  517,653 
Share in sample (%)  72.2  22.6  5.  I  0.  I  100.0 
Number of deposits  422  100  24  I  547 
Size of  average deposit (thousand $)  885  1,170  1,108  -  946 
Source:  From the  appendix to  Yalqin  Dogan. IMF Kiskurindu Turkiw. 1946-3980.  2d  ed. (Istanbul: Tekin 
Yayinevi,  1986). The information in the appendix is attributed to a study by her  Goren. 
‘At  year-end  1977 exchange rates. 
Key: Dm = Deutsche mark; SFr = Swiss franc; US$  = U.S. dollar; NLG  = Dutch guilder. 
Two aspects of  the  evidence in  table  2.13  are particularly noteworthy. 
First,  the  sheer  number  of  separate  transactions  involved  is  itself  mind- 
boggling. Judging  from the sample, the CTLD scheme must have involved 
no  less  than  2,000 different  loans  of  around $1  million  each.  While  the 
number of  foreign banks involved was substantially lower, the diffuseness of 
the  process  provides  an  important clue to  the  forthcoming crisis:  foreign 
lenders had  little  idea, until  it was too late, of  the total  amounts involved. 
One of the bankers involved  would  later express his bafflement as follows: 
“We began toting things up and  I  was quite surprised  at the exposure. For 
instance,  we would find out that a London bank was in for $100 million.  It 
was just too  astounding.  Some nights  I would  wake up in  a  cold sweat” 
(Bleakley  1978, 50). 
Secondly, the currency composition of the CTLD liabilities also deserves 
comment. As table 2.13 shows, only  about 5 percent  of the deposits  were 
denominated  in dollars, with  the rest  split between  the deutsche mark  (72 
percent)  and  the  Swiss franc (23 percent).  This is surprising  at first  sight 
given the fact that American banks played a predominant  role in the CTLD 
scheme; according  to one account,  some sixty  U.S.  banks  were  involved 
(Bleakley  1978).  Yet  this  was  the  natural  consequence of  the  incentives 
provided  by  the  borrowing  subsidies.  From  the  Turkish  borrower’s 
perspective,  borrowing  costs were  minimized  in  those markets  where the 
nominal interest rates were lowest, irrespective of potential changes in cross 
rates (recall equation  [2.2]). Since in  1975-77  these were the Euromarkets 
for the deutsche  mark  and the Swiss franc, Turkish borrowers  ovenvhelm- 
ingly chose these currencies.  The lower rates on loans denominated in these 
currencies of  course reflected  their expected appreciation  against the dollar. 
This in turn meant that the implicit subsidy was larger for borrowing  in DM 
and SFr. This is in fact borne out by the estimates of the subsidies presented 
in table 2.12. Throughout  the  1975-77  period, the  subsidy  for borrowing 
denominated  in  these  currencies  was  about  twice  that  for  borrowing 
denominated in dollars. 645  TurkeyIChapter 2 
The fluctuations  in  cross rates suggests an additional  problem  with  the 
CTLD scheme which was probably unanticipated when the program was first 
launched in May  1975. Even in the best of all possible worlds, had Turkey 
managed to maintain its peg against the dollar, the ex post subsidy on foreign 
borrowing  would  still have been positive (and sizable) as a consequence of 
the  depreciation  of  the  dollar  against  third  currencies.  The  central bank 
would  suffer losses due to the exchange guarantee even though  no formal 
devaluation  of  the  lira  had  taken  place.  As  it  happened,  there  were 
devaluations, and their  impact was magnified  by  these  cross-rate changes. 
For  the  Turkish  authorities,  this  was  a  rude  introduction  to the  world  of 
floating rates. 
Besides  the  public  finance  aspect of the CTLDs, i.e.,  the fact  that  the 
implicit subsidy payments by the central bank had to be financed somehow, 
the  scheme had  devastating behavioral  consequences. For  the  scheme not 
only  subsidized  foreign  borrowing,  it  also made the level  of  subsidization 
directly  proportional  to  the  expected  rate  of  depreciation of  the  lira  and, 
hence,  to the  magnitude  of  the  current exchange rate  disequilibrium. The 
combination gave rise to a potentially explosive scenario: the CTLD scheme 
would engender overborrowing as long as the lira was expected to depreciate 
against  some  major  currency;  the  overborrowing  would  then  cause  the 
present exchange rate to become (more) overvalued; this in turn would fuel 
expectations of further depreciation, further overborrowing, and so on until 
foreign  bankers  would  discover  the transversality  condition  and  refuse to 
play along. 
This story highlights the critical role of exchange rate policy in the process 
of debt accumulation.  Once the CTLD system got under way, the authorities 
were caught in a bind. Validating devaluationary  expectations in order to set 
the current  account straight would give rise to  large exchange losses under 
the  guarantee; refusing  to  do so  would  render  the  current  account  less 
sustainable  by  fostering  further  private  sector  borrowing.  Exchange  rate 
policy  of  the  period  strived  to  maintain,  unsuccessfully,  a  middle  road 
between the Scylla of  large transfers to domestic firms and the Charybdis of 
growing  current  account deficits.  Figure  2.1 shows the  trends  in  the  real 
effective exchange rate during the  1970s. Between 1975 and 1977, the real 
value of the lira was maintained at a roughly constant level, even though this 
constituted a real appreciation of about  10 percent relative to the  1973 level. 
The oil shock of 1973-74  had rendered a step increase in competitiveness- 
i.e., a real  depreciation-imperative,  a fact to which exchange rate  policy 
remained impervious. 
How  overvalued  was the Turkish  lira?  Table  2.14 provides  two  sets of 
estimates  of  the  extent  of  overvaluation  against  the  dollar  during  the 
1974-77  period.  The first of  these is simply the black-market  premium on 
the dollar. The second set of  estimates is derived from a computable general 
equilibrium model used by Kemal Dervi? and Sherman Robinson (1978). In 646  Merih Celkun and Dani Rodrik 
1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980 
Fig. 2.1  Real effective exchange rate, 1970:I-1980:I  (1972:I =  100) 
Table 2.14  Measures of Overvaluation of  the Turkish Lira 
~~ 
1974  1975  1976  1977 
Official exchange rate (TLI$)”  13.93  14.44  16.05  18.00 
Black-market rate  (A)b  14.35  15.76  17.64  2  I .02 
“F4uilibrium rate”  (B)C  14.70  17.80  20.30  28.20 
Overvaluation  (%): 
(A)  3.0  9.1  9.9  16.8 
(B)  5.5  23.3  26.5  56.7 
Sources: Dervi?  and  Robinson  (1978).  table  3.2;  Pick’s  World  Currencv  Yeorbook,  1984;  and  IMF, 
Internarionol Financiul Statisfirs. 
aPeriod average. 
bCalculated as the geometric average of twelve end-of-month rates. 
‘From  DerviS and Robinson (1978). See discussion in text. 
this model,  the equilibrium exchange rate  is defined as the rate  that  would 
achieve  the  current  account  path  consistent  with  a  “normal”  level  of 
reserves  and  foreign  borrowing.  While  neither  measure needs  to be  taken 
literally, they both tell the same story of increasing overvaluation  after 1974. 
By  1977  a  conservative  estimate  would  be  that  the  Turkish  lira  was 
overvalued by at least 20 percent. 
The growing overvaluation  had the consequence of  raising the subsidy on 
foreign  borrowing  beyond  any  reasonable  level. As table  2.12 shows, the 647  TurkeyIChapter 2 
average subsidy rose from around 20 percentage points at the end of  1975 to 
more than 50 points at the end of  1977. The latter figure need not be taken 
too seriously-except  for an indication of the ex post transfers made to the 
borrowers-since  few  foreign  banks  were  foolhardy  enough  to continue 
establishing CTLD accounts past mid-1977. l3 Still, an interest rate subsidy 
of  33 percentage points (at year-end  1976) must have presented an inordinate 
inducement  to borrow  as much as possible, as quickly as possible.  It is no 
wonder that many borrowers were soon willing to put up stupendously  high 
front-end fees: these fees are reported to have risen eventually  to more than 
20 percent (Kafaoglu  1986).14 The fact that the process could continue until 
mid-1977 is testimony to how oblivious foreign bankers were to the Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) notion of equilibrium credit rationing. 
2.4  Exchange Rate Policy and Debt Dynamics with CTLDs: A Model 
To  get a better grip on how exchange rate policy  and foreign borrowing 
interacted under the CTLD scheme, it is instructive  to look at a bare-bones 
model  of  the  current  account.  The  current  account  deficit,  B, can  be 
expressed  as the difference between national  expenditures and income, the 
latter of  which  equals national  product  minus interest  payments  on foreign 
debt. Abstracting from changes in reserves and direct foreign investment, B 
is also identically equal to the rate of  accumulation  of foreign debt, F. We 
can then express F as the sum of interest payments and a component which 
depends negatively  on the domestic real  interest rate and the real exchange 
rate: 
(2.4) 





F = B  = q*F - ar -  /3(e -  p)  + g, 
effective foreign rate of  interest,  assumed to be fixed; 
domestic real interest rate; 
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate and the price of traded 
goods; 
logarithm of the price of  nontraded goods; 
a shift factor. 
The current  account deficit  depends negatively  on the real  interest  rate 
since an increase in the latter reduces  domestic expenditures (consumption 
and  investment).  The  negative  sign  on  the  real  exchange  rate  can  be 
motivated either by the existence of excess capacity in the traded sector or by 
the negative real-balances  effect of  depreciations  on expenditures. The real 
interest  rate,  in  turn,  is  the  difference  between  the  relevant  nominal 
rate-which  we shall denote generally as i for now-and  the expected rate of 
domestic inflation, he. 
(2.5)  r=i-+ 648  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
where, by appeal to rational expectations, ire is assumed to equal the actual 
rate of  inflation,  itself  a weighted  average of  the  increases  in the prices of 
traded and nontraded goods: 
(2.6) 
The Turkish  authorities  controlled  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  e, and 
manipulated it with the current account deficit in mind. Their policy can be 
summarized in the following manner: 
.ir  = pi +  (1 - p)j. 
(2.7)  e  = AB. 
The greater  the  current  deficit, the  larger  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the 
exchange rate, with the rate  stabilized  only when  the target for the current 
account-here  zero-is  reached. This formalization  does not  do too much 
injustice to the actual exchange rate policy of the time, which consisted of a 
series of small adjustments. 
For simplicity, we will  abstract from the developments in the market for 
home goods and set p  equal to zero. By doing this we are neglecting  some 
important  issues  involved  in  the  so-called  capital-inflows  problem:  an 
autonomous  capital  inflow will  tend to appreciate the real exchange rate as 
long  as some of  its proceeds  are spent  on  nontraded  goods. This adds a 
further layer of  complications  to the dynamics of  debt accumulation  being 
considered  here.  But  since these complications are readily  understood, we 
leave an explicit treatment of  the home goods sector to the appendix to this 
chapter. 
As  a  benchmark  case,  consider  first  the  adjustment  process  of  the 
economy  with  a fixed  real  interest  rate, i.e., in  the absence of  the CTLD 
scheme. The model can be visualized  with the help of  figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
Figure 2.2 displays the FF schedule, which is defined as the combination of 
e  and F  that  leaves the  current  account in  balance  (i.e., F  = 0). The FF 
locus is upward-sloping  since a higher stock of  debt implies larger interest 
payments and hence requires  a more depreciated currency to equilibrate the 
current account. In the medium to long term, the economy has to locate itself 
somewhere on the FF schedule. The adjustment process of  the economy out 
of  this equilibrium  is  shown in  figure  2.3. Making  use  of  the policy  rule 
expressed in (2.7), differentiation of  (2.4) yields: 
dFfdF = q*  - PA. 
Stability of  the process requires that (2.8) be negative, i.e., that  A  > q*/P. 
Unless exchange rate policy is sufficiently responsive to the deficits, foreign 
debt may keep on growing, fueled by the servicing of the existing liabilities. 
The stable case is demonstrated  in figure 2.3. 
A  shock  to the  economy in  the  form of  an  increase  in  g-no  harm  in 
thinking of  this as government spending-shifts  the FF schedule up to F'F', 
since  at  any  level  of  debt  a  higher  e  is  now  required  for  long-run 649  TurkeyIChapter 2 
Fig. 2.2  The FF schedule 
equilibrium.  The point  on F'F'  at  which  the  economy  eventually  settles 
depends on  the adjustment  process. The higher the speed of  adjustment  of 
the exchange rate (and the lower q*), the steeper the slope of  dF/dF and the 
lower the eventual  levels  of  the  exchange rate  Z  and of  the debt stock F. 
Unless  A  is infinite, i.e., the exchange rate is adjusted instantaneously, F > 
Fo and 2 > eo. 
Now consider the effects of the CTLD scheme. As explained above, the 
scheme served to fix domestic nominal rates at the level of foreign rates (plus 
the  intermediary  banks'  margin,  which  we  ignore).  This  rendered  the 
effective real interest rate solely a (negative)  function of the (expected) rate 
of inflation, and through (2.6), of the rate of  depreciation  of the currency: 
(2.9)  r=q*-+e=  q*  - pt. 
One consequence of the policy is the magnification of the effect of any shock 
on the current account. Hence, upon the increase  in g, the current  account 
deficit  on impact, B(O), was  previously  simply  Ag. The same calculation 
now yields 
(2.10)  B(0)  = [l/(l - apA)]Ag. 650  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
Fig. 2.3  External debt accumulation 
Stability requires that (1 -  (YFA)  > 0 (see eq. [2.11] below). Further, since 
all three parameters involved in  this expression are positive, we  must  also 
have  (1 - apA) < 1. Therefore, [l/(l - apA)]  is greater than unity, which 
is  the  magnification  effect  mentioned  above.  The  larger  initial  current 
account deficit in  the  presence of  CTLDs is due to  the greater  spending 
encouraged  by  inflationary  expectations  and  fixed  nominal  interest  rates 
whenever the current account is adversely affected. Hence, in addition to the 
direct effect of  the autonomous increase in g,  we have an increase in private 
sector expenditures that  is brought about  by  the  instantaneous fall  in real 
interest rates. 
The adjustment process is also faster with  the CTLD scheme in place. 
This can be seen once again by  differentiating (2.4), and using the definition 
of  r from (2.9): 
(2.11)  dF/dF = [l/(l - apA)]  (q* - PA). 651  TurkeylChapter 2 
Stability will  require  the term  in square brackets  to be positive.  With this 
requirement  met, the  same reasoning  as in the previous  paragraph  can be 
used to show that this expression is larger than that in (2.8). In other words, 
the deficits  are now  reduced  faster,  since,  with  the stability of the process 
assured, any cut in current deficits has the added beneficial  effect of further 
reducing expenditures via the dampened inflationary expectations. 
Figure 2.4 compares the dynamics of debt accumulation with and without 
CTLDs. Note  that  the eventual stock  of  foreign  debt F (as well  as  Z)  are 
identical  in  the  two  cases.  During  the  adjustment  process,  however,  the 
current  account deficits  are always larger  with  CTLDs than  without.  The 
apparent contradiction is resolved by noting that the long-run level of debt is 
reached  faster in the first case.  In  other words,  debt is accumulated more 
rapidly with the CTLD scheme in place. How much more rapidly depends on 
the expenditure elasticity with respect to interest rates, a,  and the strength of 
the linkage between the exchange rate and the price level, p. 
The  argument  so  far  is  predicated  on  an  exchange  rate  policy-here 
represented  by  A-devised  so  that  the  process  of  debt  accumulation 
eventually settles at some stable long-run level F.  With the CTLD scheme in 
place, the stability requirement  in fact becomes more stringent. In addition 
to  the  previous  condition that  A  > q*/p,  we  now  have  (1 - apX) > 0, 
which  requires  A < l/c~p.’~  This new  upper limit on the responsiveness  of 
exchange rate policy corresponds to the fact that a “too high”  A  will cause 
too much of  a borrowing binge via inflationary expectations. In the limit, as 
i 
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A goes to infinity, foreign borrowing creates the possibility of  infinite capital 
gains. Hence, the difficult task for the authorities would have been to adjust 
the exchange rate so as to satisfy both requirements, i.e., to settle on a pace 
of  depreciation  which  was  neither  too slow  nor too rapid.  Notice  that  the 
band of  stability represented by  l/ap > A  > q*/p might have been quite a 
narrow one. In fact, no such A would have existed in the case where q*lp is 
larger than l/(~p.'~ 
The more  rapid  accumulation  of  debt  under the CTLD scheme and  the 
narrower  range of  stable  policies  in  turn  create further problems. Turkish 
borrowers might have anticipated that the CTLD scheme, like all things too 
good  to  be  true,  would  have  to  come  to  an  end.  The  end  could  be 
precipitated  either  by  the  government  or,  as  it  eventually  happened,  by 
foreign lenders who finally got their sums right. Cut off from new inflows, 
the  government  would  then  have  no  choice  but  to  undertake  larger 
depreciations  to  bring  the  current  account  under  control.  Indeed,  such 
expectations  on the part of Turkish borrowers  could  prove  self-fulfilling in 
the sense of bringing a collapse of lending where none need have occurred. 
To  see  this,  suppose that  at some  time  7  during the debt-accumulation 
process, borrowers come to believe that there is a subjective probability, 6, 
that  foreign  lenders  will  autonomously  reduce their rate of  lending.  If the 
possibility  materializes,  the  authorities  will  have  to  increase  the  rate  of 
depreciation  from A  to x.  This possibility  raises  the expected  inflation  rate 
from pA  to p[(1 - 6)A  + 6x1 and correspondingly  lowers the real interest 
rate. For sufficiently high 6 and/or x,  such expectations can be self-fulfilling 
by  rendering  the  adjustment  process  unstable.  From  7  onwards,  we  now 
have: 
(2.12)  dFldF  = {1/(1 - ap[(l - 6)A + 6x])}(q*  - PA) 
For large 6 or x,  the expression  in the curly  brackets  could turn negative, 
making dF/dF positive. This possibility is illustrated in figure 2.5. The crisis 
is now made inevitable since the borrowing  process no longer has a natural 
brake,  and  debt  will  keep  on  accumulating  until  something  gives.  The 
self-fulfilling nature of expectations here is the consequence of  the nature of 
the CTLDs: the higher the probability of  an eventual debt crisis, the cheaper 
it was to borrow. 
2.5  Recapitulation 
Did the experience of  the 1974-77  period amount to overborrowing? The 
discussion above should leave no doubt that it did. With spread and front-end 
fees included, the marginal cost of funds (denominated in DM), was at least 
20-25  percent toward the end of  1976. This amounts to a real interest rate 
burden  of  around  16-21  percent.  It  would  be  hard  to  believe  that  the 
ongoing investment drive in Turkey justified borrowing  on such terms. The 653  TurkeyKhapter 2 
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authorities not only greatly subsidized foreign borrowing, but they also did 
so in a way that seriously hampered the dynamic stability of the process. To 
be sure, the CTLD scheme allowed a domestic credit explosion to finance a 
rapid  increase  in  private  sector  expenditures  alongside  the  public  sector 
investment drive,  and  helped  engineer  unprecedented  rates  of  economic 
growth. But the edifice was constructed on inherently shaky foundations. 
The CTLD episode lasted for roughly two years, between May  1975 and 
July  1977.  Given  the  problems  already  discussed,  even  this  might  be 
considered as too long a time frame. Why did the foreign banks not pull out 
earlier? Some clues to the answer have been given above.  Banks seem to 
have had  little knowledge of  the rapid  rise of  Turkey’s  aggregate foreign 
liabilities, and do not appear to have analyzed the behavioral consequences 
of  the scheme in  any great detail. One account suggests that banks would 
“test”  the  CTLDs by  frequently withdrawing their money,  to redeposit it 
again  promptly  (Brennan  1976, 84). With  a  sufficiently large number of 
banks all doing the same, the information content of this strategy must have 
been  close  to  nil.  Individual  banks  simply  imitated  their  competitors’ 654  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
behavior  with  the  assurance  that,  were  a  crisis to  come,  they  would  be 
caught in good company. 
How  about  the  government authorities? Here a  number of  factors  must 
have  been  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  scheme.  Perhaps 
foremost was the desire to maintain, for political as well as sound economic 
reasons, the investment effort. As has been aptly stressed by Boratav (1986): 
[tlhis was  a period  when  the  rivalry  and confrontation  between  the two 
major parties for the allegiance of  the main social groups took acute and, 
at  times,  violent  forms.  The alternating  governments-the  Republican 
People’s  Party  (RPP)  in  1974  and  the  Justice  Party  (JP)  during 
1975-77-could,  therefore,  not  afford  to  suspend  the  well-rooted 
distributional  and  allocational  mechanisms of  populism.  And  . . . these 
mechanisms  could  produce  the  intended  results  only  in  an  expanding 
economy. (2) 
The ready availability of foreign exchange through  the CTLD scheme must 
have  served  to  create  the  illusion  of  a  soft  budget  constraint on  public 
investment.  Hence, after 1973 the realized levels of public sector investment 
(as a share of public sector income) consistently exceeded the planned levels 
under the annual programs.”  Second, lack of experience with floating rates 
must  have  obscured  the  ill-effects  of  cross-rate  changes discussed  earlier. 
Third, a lack of  recognition of the overvaluation of the current exchange rate 
also would have played a role in minimizing the risks involved. Besides, the 
margin  of  indeterminacy  noted above with respect to outcomes might have 
provided some ground for optimism. Finally, we might add the most cynical 
explanation  of  all:  it  was  likely  that  the  eventual mess  would  have  to  be 
cleared up by the next government, which is precisely  what happened. 
The  CTLDs  were  eventually  consolidated  and  rescheduled  in  an 
agreement signed in August  1979.  Principal repayments on these liabilities 
began  again  in  1984, for the  first  time  since July  1977. The burden  of 
servicing the CTLD overhang would prove to be a substantial one in a period 
of vast real depreciations of the Turkish lira. Who paid the subsidies implicit 
in the CTLD scheme? Technically, the burden  was the Treasury’s,  but  the 
central  bank  was  the  effective  source of  payments  as the  Treasury never 
compensated the bank. Lacking resources of its own, the central bank had to 
generate funds somehow.  As will be discussed  in the following  chapters, it 
did so partly through the inflation tax and partly by shifting the burden onto 
future generations via renewed external borrowing. 
Appendix 
Consider  the  effect  of  foreign  borrowing  on  home-goods  prices.  Since 
borrowing  allows a higher  level  of  domestic expenditures, it  puts upward 
pressure on the prices of  such goods. This is the familiar  problem  of  real 655  TurkeyIChapter 3 
appreciation  of  the  exchange rate  in  the  presence  of  capital  inflows.  To 
represent  this  process,  let  the  rate  of  increase of  home-good  prices,  p,  be 
proportional  to the excess of expenditures  over income, as captured by  the 
current account deficit B: 
(A2.1)  p  = OB. 
Now the expected rate of inflation has an additional component coming from 
the dynamics of p: 
(A2.2) 
Using this, we can calculate the impact effect of Ag  on the current account 
as follows: 
7i = pi + (1 - p)& 
(A2.3)  b(O)=  -{1/(1  - a[pA  + (1 -  p)O])}Ag, 
which  is greater  due to expectations  of  higher  inflation.  The dynamics  of 
debt are in turn determined by: 
(A2.4)  dF/dF = {1/(1 - a[pA + (1 - p)O])}(q*  - P(A - 0)). 
Once again, the stable region for A  is smaller. In other words,  incorporating 
the  dynamics  of  the  nontraded  sector  makes  instability  more  likely  and 
exchange rate management more problematic. 
3  Crisis Without Adjustment, 
1978  -79 
The debt crisis developing in mid-1977 threw Turkey into a period of  forced 
adjustment. As foreign exchange sources dried up, external balance became 
for the first time in many years a genuinely binding constraint,  requiring an 
adjustment in the relation  between  income and absorption in the economy. 
Until the reform  package of January  1980, the policies employed by  the 
authorities  were  unsuccessful  in  extricating  the Turkish  economy  from  the 
crisis. In view of  the foreign exchange constraint, some belt-tightening had 
become  inescapable.  However,  the  governments  in  power  during  this 
period-and  there were many-compounded  the problems by their refusal to 
implement vigorous  adjustment measures.  The investment boom collapsed, 
economic  growth  came  crashing  down,  inflation  rose  to  unprecedented 
heights,  and  income  distribution  worsened  disastrously.  The only  positive 
development was the beginning of a series of debt reschedulings with official 